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Appendix A List of Notation
The following notation is used throughout this paper.
 : demand rate.
 : standard deviation of demand per period.
D(t) : demand in t periods.
D[t;  ] : demand in the interval [t;  ].
Fn() : cumulative distribution function of demands in n periods.
fn() : probability density function of demands in n periods in the case of continuous
demand, or probability mass function of demands in n periods in the case of discrete demand.
S : order-up-to level in a static inventory policy.
St : order-up-to level chosen in period t.
S : rst-best base-stock level in a static inventory policy.
L : inventory replenishment lead time, which is assumed to be constant.
W : delivery time window.
Y : length of delay until a demand is lled.
h : unit inventory holding cost per time period.
p : unit transfer price.
R : length of a review phase (number of periods in a review phase).
XWt : performance indicator for period t.
WR : cumulative inventory performance during a review phase, 
W
R =
PR
t=1X
W
t .
AWR : ready rate in a review phase, A
W
R = 
W
R =R.
AW : expected ready rate (in the long run), AW = limR!1AWR .
 : performance threshold for AWR .
K : in the case of lump-sum penalty, K represents the xed amount of penalty; in the
case of linear penalty, it represents the penalty rate penalty paid by the supplier to the
buyer per 1% below .
B : in the case of lump-sum bonus, B represents the xed amount of bonus; in the case
of linear bonus, it represents the bonus rate bonus paid by the supplier to the buyer per
1% above .
CP (A
W
R j S; ;K) : suppliers average penalty per period when the supplier chooses a
static base-stock policy with the base-stock level S and the realized review-phase ready rate
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is AWR , given the ready rate threshold  and penalty parameter K.
VL(S j ;K) : suppliers average cost under a static base-stock S policy given the contract
parameters (;K), also denoted by VL(S) for simplicity.
L(S j p; ;K) : suppliers average prot under a static base-stock S policy given the
contract parameters (p; ;K).
CD(Y j S) : buyers backorder cost per unit demand given the base-stock level S, it is
increasing and convex in the length of delay Y .
UL(p; ;K; S) : buyers average cost under a static base-stock S policy given the contract
parameters (p; ;K).
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We rst compute the mean and variance of WR . To do this, we
need to compute E(WR ) and E[(
W
R )
2].
For L  0 and 0  W  L,
E(WR ) =
XR
t=1
E(XWt ) = RFL+1 W (S),
and
E[(WR )
2] = E
h
(
XR
i=1
XWi )(
XR
j=1
XWj )
i
=
XR
i=1
XR
j=1
E(XWi X
W
j )
=
XR
i=1
XR
j=1
E[1fD[i  L; i W ]  Sg  1fD[j   L; j  W ]  Sg].
In the above summation, the number of (i; i) terms is R, and the sum of these terms is
M1 = RE[1fD(L+ 1 W )  Sg] = RFL+1 W (S);
the number of (i; j) terms with XWi and X
W
j independent is
2
XR (L+1 W )
i=1
i =
XR (L+1 W )
i=1
i+
XR (L+1 W )
j=1
(R  L+W   j)
=
XR (L+1 W )
i=1
(i+R  L+W   i) = (R  L+W )(R  L+W   1),
which is the number of pairs of XWi and X
W
j di¤ering by at least L + 1  W periods, and
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the sum of these terms is
M2 = (R  L+W )(R  L+W   1)E[1fD(L+ 1 W )  Sg]E[1fD(L+ 1 W )  Sg]
= (R  L+W )(R  L+W   1)[FL+1 W (S)]2.
If L > 0, then the number of (i; j) terms with n (1  n  L  W ) periods of demands in
common is 2[R  (L+ 1) +n+W ], which is the number of pairs of XWi and XWj di¤ering by
exactly L+ 1  n W periods. For i < j and j = i+ L+ 1  n W ,
E(XWi X
W
j ) = PrfD[i  L; i W ]  S;D[j   L; j  W ]  Sg
= PrfD[i  L; j   L  1] +D(n)  S;D(n) +D[i+ 1 W; j  W ]  Sg
=
Z S
0
[FL+1 n W (S   x)]2dFn(x).
Because
Cov(D[i  L; i W ]; D[j   L; j  W ])
= Cov(D[i  L; j   L  1] +D[j   L; i W ]; D[j   L; i W ] +D[i+ 1 W; j  W ])
= V ar(D(n)) > 0 and increases with n,
D[i L; i W ] andD[j L; j W ] are positively correlated, and
Z S
0
[FL+1 n W (S x)]2dFn(x)
increases with n. Then we obtain that
E(XWi X
W
j ) = PrfD[i  L; i W ]  SgPrfD[j   L; j  W ]  S j D[i  L; i W ]  Sg
 FL+1 W (S) PrfD[j   L; j  W ]  Sg = [FL+1 W (S)]2,
which implies that
E(XWi X
W
j )  [FL+1 W (S)]2. (3)
The sum of the terms with each pair di¤ering by exactly L+ 1  n W periods is
M3 =
XL W
n=1
2[R  (L+ 1) + n+W ]
Z S
0
[FL+1 n W (S   x)]2dFn(x).
We thus obtain that E[(WR )
2] = M1 + M2 + M3, and because (WR )
2 = V ar(WR ) =
3
E[(WR )
2]  [E(WR )]2,
(WR )
2 = RFL+1 W (S)  [(L W )(2R  L+W   1) +R] [FL+1 W (S)]2
+
XL W
n=1
2 [R  (L+ 1) + n+W ]
Z S
0
[FL+1 n W (S   x)]2 dFn(x). (4)
By (3),
(WR )
2  RFL+1 W (S)  [(L W )(2R  L+W   1) +R][FL+1 W (S)]2
+
XL W
n=1
2 [R  (L+ 1) + n+W ] [FL+1 W (S)]2
= RFL+1 W (S) [1  FL+1 W (S)] .
It follows that
lim
R!1
(WR )
2=R2=3  lim
R!1
R1=3FL+1 W (S)[1  FL+1 W (S)] =1.
The sequence fXtg is (L + 1   W )-dependent because any subsequence fXtj ; j  1g 
fXtg, with tj + L + 1   W < tj+1 for every j  1, is a sequence of independent random
variables. Moreover, Xt  1 for all t. Applying Theorem 7.3.1 (Chung 19741 page 214),
[WR   E(WR )]=WR converges in distribution to a standard normal random variable Z [Z 
N(0; 1)] as R approaches innity.
For the special case of L = W = 0, the standard deviation 0R is simplied to 
0
R =p
RF1(S)[1  F1(S)].
Proof of Proposition 2. For L = W = 0, the exact value of Prf0R = i j Sg is given by
Prf0R = i j Sg =

R
i

[F1(S)]
i [1  F1(S)]R i , (5)
where F1(S) = PrfD(1)  Sg.
For L > 0 and 0  W  L, using the result in Section 3.2.2, the distribution of WR
is approximately normal with mean RFL+1 W (S) and standard deviation WR , where 
W
R is
given by (4). Using a continuity correction,
PrfWR = i j Sg =
8><>:
(z0), if i = 0;
(zi)  (zi 1), if 0 < i < R;
1  (zR 1), if i = R;
(6)
where() is the cdf of the standard normal distribution and zi = [i+ 0:5 RFL+1 W (S)] =WR .
1K. L. Chung. A Course in Probability Theory. Academic Press, San Diego, 3rd edition, 2001.
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We provide the analysis for each of the four cases (L = 0 or > 0, and lump-sum or linear
penalty) respectively. Assume continuous-valued demand and base-stock level S.
1) Lump-sum penalty SLA, L = W = 0
The suppliers cost function is
V0(S) = hE[S  D(1)]+ + K
R
XR
i=0
Prf0R = i j Sg,
where Prf0R = i j Sg is given by (5).
It follows that
dV0(S)
dS
= F1(S)

h K

R  1
R

[F1(S)]
R 1[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 1f1(S)

. (7)
Given any  < F1(S), dV0(S)=dSjS=S = 0. Thus the optimal K is given as
K() = h

R  1
R

[F1(S
)]R 1[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 1f1(S)

,
where f1() is the pdf of single-period demand.
2) Lump-sum penalty SLA, L > 0, 0  W  L
Let zi(S) = [i+ 0:5 RFL+1 W (S)] =WR for 0  i  R. It follows from (1) and (6)
that the suppliers cost function is
VL(S) = hE[S  D(L+ 1 W )]+ +K(zR(S))=R,
thus
dVL(S)
dS
= hFL+1 W (S) +
K
R
(zR(S))
dzR(S)
dS
.
Letting dVL(S)=dSjS=S = 0 we obtain that
K() =  RhFL+1 W (S)= [(zR(S))(dzR(S)=dS)] .
3) Linear penalty SLA, L = W = 0
The suppliers cost function is
V0(S) = hE[S  D(1)]+ + K
R
XR
i=0
(R + 1  i) Prf0R = i j Sg,
where Prf0R = i j Sg is given by (5). It follows that
dV0(S)
dS
= hF1(S) K
XR
i=0

R  1
i

[F1(S)]
i[1  F1(S)]R i 1f1(S). (8)
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Given  < F1(S), dV0(S)=dSjS=S = 0 implies that
K() = hF1(S)
XR
i=0

R  1
i

[F1(S
)]i[1  F1(S)]R i 1f1(S)

.
4) Linear penalty SLA, L > 0, 0  W  L
The suppliers cost function is
VL(S) = hE[S  D(L+ 1 W )]+ + K
R
XR
i=0
(R + 1  i) PrfWR = i j Sg.
Let z^(x; S) = [x RFL+1 W (S)] =WR for 0  i  R. Using the results in Proposition
1, the approximation for VL(S) is
VL(S) = hE[S  D(L+ 1 W )]+ + K
R
Z
xR
(R  x)d(z^(x; S))
= hE[S  D(L+ 1 W )]+ + K
R
Z
xR
(z^(x; S))dx.
It follows that
dVL(S)
dS
= hFL+1 W (S) +
K
R
Z
xR
d
dS
(z^(x; S))dx
= hFL+1 W (S) +
K
R

 RfL+1 W (S)(z^(R; S)) + d
W
R
dS
(z^(R; S))

.
Letting dVL(S)=dSjS=S = 0 we can obtain
K() = RhFL+1 W (S)

RfL+1 W (S)(z^(R; S))  d
W
R
dS
(z^(R; S))

,
where WR is given by (4).
Proposition 2 follows from all the above derivations for the optimal K given .
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume continuous-valued demand and base-stock level S.
Consider linear penalty SLA and L = 0. It follows from (8) that given  and K(),
dV0(S)
dS
= hF1(S) K()
XR
i=0

R  1
i

[F1(S)]
i[1  F1(S)]R i 1f1(S),
d2V0(S)
dS2
= hf1(S) +K
()(R  1)

R  2
R

[F1(S)]
R[1  F1(S)]R R 2[f1(S)]2
 K()
XR
i=0

R  1
i

[F1(S)]
i[1  F1(S)]R i 1f 01(S).
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At any value of S satisfying dV0(S)=dS = 0,
XR
i=0

R  1
i

[F1(S)]
i[1  F1(S)]R i 1f1(S) = hF1(S)
K()
,
and we can rewrite the second derivative d2V0(S)=dS2 as
d2V0(S)
dS2

dV0(S)=dS=0
=
h[(f1(S))
2   F1(S)f 01(S)]
f1(S)
+K()(R  1)

R  2
R

[F1(S)]R[1  F1(S)]R R 2[f1(S)]2.
Because f1(S) is log-concave, we nd from Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) that F1(S) is
also log-concave, which means that [f1(S)]2   F1(S)f 01(S)  0 for all S. It thus follows that
d2V0(S)=dS
2jdV0(S)=dS=0  0, and V0(S) is quasi-convex in S. Solving dV0(S)=dS = 0 gives
the optimal base-stock level S.
Proof of Theorem 1. For ease of exposition, we make the following transformation on
the simple inventory model: we let e = F1(S) and C(e) = hE[S  D(1)]+, thus the optimal
e = F1(S). In the transformed model, the supplier can make an e¤ort to achieve a good
performance outcome in a period with probability e, incurring a cost C(e). Thus S = F 11 (e),
C(e)  0, and lime!1C(e) = limS!1 hE[S  D(1)]+ =1.
We also nd that
C 0(e) =
@
@S
fhE[S  D(1)]+g  @S
@e
= hF1(S)=f1(S) > 0,
and because f1(S) is log-concave,
C 00(e) =
@
@S
[C 0(e)] @S
@e
= h[(f1(S))
2   F1(S)f 01(S)]=[f1(S)]3  0.
Given an R-period review phase, we rst consider the suppliers cost from using a static
policy.
Under a lump-sum penalty SLA with the threshold  and the xed penalty K, the sup-
pliers expected total cost in a review phase given the e¤ort level e in each period is
V (e) = RC(e) +K
XR
i=0
PrfR = ijeg = RC(e) +K
XR
i=0
ai,
where
ai = PrfR = ijeg =

R
i

(e)i(1  e)R i.
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From the rst-order condition for V (e), to induce the optimal e, the penalty given any
, K(), should satisfy K() = C 0(e)=(), where
() = aN(R N)=[R(1  e)] with N = R.
Thus C 0(e) = ()K().
Similarly, under a linear penalty SLA with the threshold  and the penalty rate K^, the
suppliers expected total cost in a review phase given e is
V^ (e) = RC(e) + K^
XR
i=0
(R + 1  i)ai.
Note the use of ^  for distinguishing the linear penalty from the lump-sum in the proof
of this theorem.
To induce the optimal e, the penalty rate given any , K^(), should satisfy K^() =
C 0(e)=^(), where
^() =
XR
i=0
(R  i)ai=[R(1  e)] = (RA  P )=[R(1  e)] < 1,
where A =
PN
i=0 ai and P =
PN
i=0 iai. Thus K^
() is decreasing in , and C 0(e) =
^()K^(). Because ^() > (), we have K() > K^().
Because A > aN and P < NA, simple algebra shows that
A(RA  P )  [(N + 1)A  P ] aN(R N) > 0.
Thus ^()A > () [(N + 1)A  P ], and
V (e)  V^ (e) = C 0(e)
h
A=()  [(N + 1)A  P ] =^()
i
> 0.
Next, we consider the suppliers dynamic policy.
The suppliers cost to go from period t onwards is
vt(i) = C(et) + etvt+1(i+ 1) + (1  et)vt+1(i)
= vt+1(i) + C(et)  etvt+1(i)
= vt+1(i+ 1) + C(et) + (1  et)vt+1(i), (9)
where
vt+1(i)  vt+1(i)  vt+1(i+ 1),
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and the optimal et satises C 0(et) = vt+1(i).
We compare the suppliers cost from a dynamic policy with that from a static policy
under each penalty. Let
rt(i) = vt(i)=V (e
) and r^t(i) = v^t(i)=V^ (e),
where i is the suppliers cumulative performance at the beginning of period t, i.e., the number
of periods with good performance in the past t 1 periods. We use backward induction to show
that, starting in some period T  R, for t  T , we have rt(i)  r^t(i) for 0  i  minft; Rg,
and by backward induction, r1(0)  r^1(0). Thus the percentage cost savings under the
lump-sum penalty is greater than that under the linear-penalty, i.e., 1  r1(0)  1  r^1(0).
The suppliers terminal values (penalty incurred at the end of a review phase) under the
lump-sum and the linear penalty SLAs are
vR+1(i) =
(
K if i  R,
0 if i > R;
and v^R+1(i) =
(
K^(R + 1  i) if i  R,
0 if i > R,
respectively.
Thus we obtain that vR+1(i) =
8><>:
0 if i < R,
K if i = R,
0 if i > R;
and v^R+1(i) =
8><>:
K^ if i < R,
K^ if i = R,
0 if i > R.
Suppliers Period R problem given the threshold R:
It follows from (9) and the results for Period t+ 1 that
vR(i) =
8><>:
K if i  R  1,
K + C(e(K))  e(K)K if i = R,
0 if i > R;
and
v^R(i) =
(
K^(R + 1  i) + C(e^(K^))  e^(K^)K^ if i  R,
0 if i > R.
There exsits some R  R such that for i  R, rR(i)  r^R(i). For i > R, rR(i) =
r^R(i) = 0. For a limited number of i between R and R, rR(i)  r^R(i) may not hold.
When i = R   2, rR(i) = KV (e) and r^R(i) = 3K^+C(e^R(i)) e^R(i)K^V^ (e) . We may have rR(i) <
r^R(i).
When i = R   1, rR(i) = KV (e) and r^R(i) = 2K^+C(e^R(i)) e^R(i)K^V^ (e) . According to numerical
results, rR(i) > r^R(i).
Thus R is generally close to R.
We can obtain that
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vR(i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if i  R  2,
e(K)K   C(e(K)) if i = R  1,
K + C(e(K))  e(K)K if i = R,
0 if i > R;
and
v^R(i) =
8><>:
K^ if i  R  1,
K^ + C(e^(K^))  e^(K^)K^ if i = R,
0 if i > R.
For the lump-sum penalty, an optimal contract should result in
V (e) = RC(e) +K
XR
i=0
PrfR = ijeg < K
because otherwise, the supplier would choose e = 0 in each period for a static policy and ob-
tain an expected total costK. It follows from the inequality thatRC(e) < K
PR
i=R+1 PrfR =
ijeg, and
C(e) <
K
R
XR
i=R+1
PrfR = ijeg.
Note thatK+C(e(K)) e(K)K < K+C(e) eK because e(K)minimizesK+C(e) eK,
which implies that
e(K)K   C(e(K)) > eK   C(e) > eK   K
R
XR
i=R+1
PrfR = ijeg
= K

e   1
R
XR
i=R+1
PrfR = ijeg

> K^.
By induction, for 0  n  R  1, we nd that
1. if 0  i  R  n  1,
vR n(i) = K;
v^R n(i) = K^(R + 1  i) + (n+ 1)
h
C(e^(K^))  e^(K^)K^
i
.
rR n(i) = vR n(i)=V (e) < v^R n(i)=V^ (e) = r^R n(i) for small i or large n.
2. If i = R  n,
vR n(i) = K+C(e(R n)) e(R n)R n, where R = K, t = et+1(t+1)t+1 C(et+1(t+1));
v^R n(i) = (n+ 1)
h
K^ + C(e^(K^))  e^(K^)K^
i
.
vR n(i) < K, thus rR n(i) < r^R n(i) for large n.
3. If i = R, for n  R  R  1,
vR n(i) = KR n 1, where KR  K, Kt 1  Kt + C(e(Kt))  e(Kt)Kt;
v^R n(i) = K^R n 1, where K^R = K^, K^t 1  K^t + C(e(K^t))  e(K^t)K^t.
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Consider vR n(i)=vR n+1(i) = KR n 1=KR n = [KR n + C(e(KR n))  e(KR n)KR n] =KR n.
For any k > 0 such that C 0(e) = k, by the Envelope Theorem,
@
@k
f[k + C(e(k))  e(k)k] =kg = e0(k) [C 0(e(k))=k   1]  C(e(k))=k2
=  C(e(k))=k2 < 0,
thus [k + C(e(k))  e(k)k] =k 2 (0; 1) and decreases in k;
also by the Envelope Theorem,
@
@k
[k + C(e(k))  e(k)k] = 1 + C 0(e(k))e0(k)  e0(k)k   e(k)
= 1  e(k) > 0 as e(k) < 1.
SinceK > K^, we can conclude thatKR n 1=KR n < K^R n 1=K^R n and thus vR n 1=vR n <
v^R n 1=v^R n.
Note that
vR n 1
V (e)
=
vR n
V (e)
vR n 1
vR n
and
v^R n 1
V^ (e)
=
v^R n
V^ (e)
v^R n 1
v^R n
.
Therefore, there exists n > 0 such that for n  n, rR n 1 < r^R n 1.
4. For n  R  R  1, if i  R, then vR n(i) = v^R n(i) = 0.
Because vt(i) = C(et) + etvt+1(i+ 1) + (1  et)vt+1(i),
vt+1(i+ 1) < vt(i) < vt+1(i),
we nd that rt+1(i + 1) < rt(i) < rt+1(i). Starting in period R, there are only a limited
number of cases (e.g., i = R  1 and i = R) such that rR(i) > r^R(i). As we go backward,
by some period T = t+ 1, we will have rt+1(i)  r^t+1(i) for 0  i  minft; Rg.
Now suppose that in some period t+ 1, rt+1(i)  r^t+1(i) for 0  i  minft; Rg.
Because vt(i) = vt+1(i) + C(et(i))  et(i)vt+1(i),
rt(i) = vt(i)=V (e
) = rt+1(i) + C(et(i))=V (e)  et(i)rt+1(i),
where rt+1(i) = rt+1(i)  rt+1(i+ 1) = vt+1(i)=V (e).
By the Envelope Theorem,
@[rt+1(i) + C(e)=V   ert+1(i)]=@V
= C 0(e)e0=V   C(e)=V 2   e0rt+1(i) =  C(e)=V 2 < 0.
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Since V (e) > V^ (e), we can obtain that, for rt(i) and r^t(i) with rt+1(i) = r^t+1(i) and
rt+1(i+ 1) = r^t+1(i+ 1) (thus rt+1(i) = r^t+1(i)), rt(i) < r^t(i) holds.
It follows that, if rt+1(i)  r^t+1(i), because @@k [C(e(k)) + (1  e(k))k] = 1  e(k) > 0,
we can obtain that
r^t(i) = r^t+1(i+ 1) + [1  e^(r^t+1(i))] r^t+1(i) + C(e^(r^t+1(i)))=V^ (e)
 r^t+1(i+ 1) + [1  e^(rt+1(i))]rt+1(i) + C(e^(rt+1(i)))=V^ (e)
> rt+1(i+ 1) + [1  e^(rt+1(i))]rt+1(i) + C(e^(rt+1(i)))=V^ (e)
> rt(i).
If rt+1(i)  r^t+1(i), because @@k [C(e(k))  e(k)k] =  e(k) < 0, we obtain that
r^t(i) = r^t+1(i) + C(e^(r^t+1(i)))=V^   e^(r^t+1(i))r^t+1(i)
> r^t+1(i) + C(e^(rt+1(i)))=V^   e^(rt+1(i))rt+1(i)
> rt(i).
Therefore, we nd that rt(i) < r^t(i), r1(0) < r^1(0), and 1  r1(0)  1  r^1(0).
This theorem is thus proved.
Appendix C Other Derivations
C.1 Unimodality of suppliers cost function under a lump-sum
penalty SLA (Section 4.2.1)
The derivation is based on continuous-valued demand and base-stock level S. Consider the
case where L = 0.
It follows from (7) that given  and K(),
dV0(S)
dS
= hF1(S) K()

R  1
R

[F1(S)]
R[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 1f1(S),
d2V0(S)
dS2
= hf1(S) K()

R  1
R

fR[F1(S)]R 1[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 1[f1(S)]2
 [R(1  )  1][F1(S)]R[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 2[f1(S)]2
+[F1(S)]
R[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 1f 01(S)g.
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At any value of S satisfying dV0(S)=dS = 0,
R  1
R

[F1(S)]
R[1  F1(S)]R(1 ) 1f1(S) = hF1(S)
K()
,
and we can rewrite d2V0(S)=dS2 as
d2V0(S)
dS2

dV0(S)=dS=0
= h

[f1(S)]
2   F1(S)f 01(S) 
[f1(S)]
2[R  (R  1)F1(S)]
1  F1(S)

.
As we have shown for the case of linear penalty in the proof of Proposition 3, because
f1(S) is log-concave, [f1(S)]2   F1(S)f 01(S)  0 for all S. Because  < F1(S) and R is
integer,  is generally chosen such that RF1(S)   R  1 > F1(S). It follows that at
S = S, d
2V0(S)
dS2

dV0(S)=dS=0
> 0. Thus S is a local optimum.
But V0(S) may not be unimodal. For small S and S < S,
df[F1(S)]R 2[1  F1(S)]R(1 )f1(S)g=dS > 0.
Depending on the value of S and R, it is possible that for S < S, dV0(S)=dS > 0. This
can be seen from Figure 2 (a).
C.2 Formulas for optimal K given  for discrete demand (Section
5.2)
Consider discrete demand and thus discrete base-stock level S. Given any , to induce the
supplier to choose S, K() should be chosen such that
VL(S
 + 1)  VL(S)  0 and VL(S   1)  VL(S)  0, (10)
where VL(S) is given in the proof of Proposition 2 for each type of penalty SLA and di¤erent
values of L.
1) Lump-sum penalty SLA, L = W = 0
Because E[S d]+ = PSd=0(S d)f1(d) and f1(d) = PrfD(1) = dg, it follows from (10)
that
hF1(S
) +
K
R
XR
i=0
 
Prf0R = i j S + 1g   Prf0R = i j Sg
  0,
and
 hF1(S   1) + K
R
XR
i=0
(Prf0R = i j S   1g   Prf0R = i j Sg  0.
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It can be seen from (7) that
PR
i=0 Prf0R = i j Sg is decreasing in S. ThusXR
i=0
(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S + 1g) > 0,
and XR
i=0
(Prf0R = i j S   1g   Prf0R = i j Sg) > 0.
The interval of optimal K() is obtained as
[K(); K()] =
"
RhF1(S
   1)PR
i=0(Prf0R = i j S   1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)
;
RhF1(S
)PR
i=0(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S + 1g)
#
.
2) Lump-sum penalty SLA, L > 0, 0  W  L
It follows from (10) that
hFL+1 W (S) +
K
R
[(zR(S
 + 1))  (zR(S))]  0,
and
 hFL+1 W (S   1) + K
R
[(zR(S
   1))  (zR(S))]  0,
which give us the interval of optimal K() as
[K(); K()] =

RhFL+1 W (S   1)
(zR(S   1))  (zR(S)) ,
RhFL+1 W (S)
(zR(S))  (zR(S + 1))

.
3) Linear penalty SLA, L = W = 0
It follows from (10) that
hF1(S
) +
K
R
XR
i=0
(R + 1  i)(Prf0R = i j S + 1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)  0, (11)
and
 hF1(S 1)+K
R
XR
i=0
(R+1  i)(Prf0R = i j S 1g Prf0R = i j Sg)  0. (12)
It can be seen from (8) that the second term in V0(S) is decreasing in S, thusXR
i=0
(R + 1  i)(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S + 1g) > 0,
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and XR
i=0
(R + 1  i)(Prf0R = i j S   1g   Prf0R = i j Sg) > 0.
Then it follows from (11) and (12) that
[K(); K()] =
"
RhF1(S
   1)PR
i=0(R + 1  i)(Prf0R = i j S   1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)
,
RhF1(S
)PR
i=0(R + 1  i)(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S + 1g)
#
.
4) Linear penalty SLA, L > 0, 0  W  L
It follows from (10) that
hFL+1 W (S) +
K
R
XR
i=0
(R + 1  i)(PrfWR = i j S + 1g   PrfWR = i j Sg)  0,
and
 hFL+1 W (S 1)+K
R
XR
i=0
(R+1  i)(PrfWR = i j S 1g PrfWR = i j Sg)  0.
Thus
[K(); K()] =
"
RhFL+1 W (S   1)PR
i=0(R + 1  i)(PrfWR = i j S   1g   PrfWR = i j Sg)
;
RhFL+1 W (S)PR
i=0(R + 1  i)(PrfWR = i j Sg   PrfWR = i j S + 1g)
#
,
where PrfWR = i j Sg is given by (6).
C.3 Formulas for optimal B given  (Section 6)
1) Lump-sum bonus SLA
The suppliers cost function is given by
V0(S) = hE[S  D(1)]+   B
R
XR
i=R
Prf0R = i j Sg.
We consider the cases of continuous and discrete valued demand and base-stock level
S, respectively.
Continuous demand and S:
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The rst-order derivative of the suppliers cost function is
dV0(S)
dS
= hF1(S) B

R  1
R  1

[F1(S)]
R 1[1  F1(S)]R Rf1(S).
The optimal bonus B() given  is obtained by letting dV0(S)=dSjS=S = 0:
B() =
hF1(S
) 
R 1
R 1

[F1(S)]R 1[1  F1(S)]R Rf1(S)
.
Discrete demand and S:
Given any , to induce the supplier to choose S, K() should be chosen such that
V0(S
 + 1)  V0(S)  0 and V0(S   1)  V0(S)  0.
It follows that
hF1(S
)  B
R
XR
i=R
(Prf0R = i j S + 1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)  0,
and
 hF1(S   1)  B
R
XR
i=R
(Prf0R = i j S   1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)  0.
PR
i=R Prf0R = i j Sg is increasing in S, thusXR
i=R
(Prf0R = i j S + 1g   Prf0R = i j Sg) > 0,
and XR
i=R
(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S   1g) > 0.
The interval of optimal B() is given as
[B(); B()] =
"
RhF1(S
   1)PR
i=R(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S   1g)
,
RhF1(S
)PR
i=R(Prf0R = i j S + 1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)
#
.
2) Linear bonus SLA
We again consider the cases of continuous and discrete valued demand and base-stock
level S, respectively.
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Continuous demand and S:
The rst-order derivative of the suppliers cost function is
dV0(S)
dS
= hF1(S) B
XR
i=R

R  1
i  1

[F1(S)]
i 1[1  F1(S)]R if1(S).
The optimal bonus B() given  is obtained by letting dV0(S)=dSjS=S = 0:
B() =
hF1(S
)PR
i=R
 
R 1
i 1

[F1(S)]i 1[1  F1(S)]R if1(S)
.
Discrete demand and S:
Given any , to induce the supplier to choose S, K() should be chosen such that
V0(S
 + 1)  V0(S)  0 and V0(S   1)  V0(S)  0.
It follows that the interval of optimal B() is
[B(); B()] =
"
RhF1(S
   1)PR
i=R(i  R + 1)(Prf0R = i j Sg   Prf0R = i j S   1g)
,
RhF1(S
)PR
i=R(i  R + 1)(Prf0R = i j S + 1g   Prf0R = i j Sg)
#
:
Appendix D Dynamic Program for L = 0 (Section 5)
We mainly study the cases of L = 0 and 1 with W = 0. But the major ndings also hold
for the cases of L > 1 and 0  W  L. For a positive lead time L > 0, the suppliers
performance realization from her action in any period is delayed until L periods later. So
when choosing the order quantity (equivalently, the inventory order-up-to level) in period
t, the supplier has to anticipate possible performance outcomes in periods t; t + 1; : : : ;and
t+ L  1, which depend on the order quantities chosen in period t  `, (` = 1; 2; : : : ; L).
We rst investigate the suppliers cost minimization problem in a single review phase
under the contract, ignoring the impact of the inventory policy on the subsequent review
phases. After we obtain the suppliers minimum cost for a single-review-phase problem, we
then calculate the suppliers minimum long-run average cost.
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D.1 Single-review-phase problem
Consider a single review phase with R periods. The decision epochs = f1; 2; : : : ; R;R + 1g,
and there is no decision made in period R + 1. Let
dt = demand in period t;
St = inventory order-up-to level chosen in period t;
t = suppliers performance history number of periods without stockout up to the end
of period t, 0  t  t for 1  t  R.
Assume the supplier can always observe her performance history.
The dynamic program for L = 0 is a straightforward derivation from L = 1, so we rst
provide a detailed description for the L = 1 case, and then briey present the L = 0 case.
D.1.1 The case of L = 1
By Proposition 1 and letting L = 1 and W = 0, the distribution of R is approximately
normal with mean RF2(S) and standard deviation R, where
2R = RF2(S)  (3R  2) [F2(S)]2 + 2(R  1)
XS
d=0
[F1(S   d)]2 f1(d).
Let I^t = the suppliers inventory position (inventory plus the order made in the last period)
at the beginning of period t, before an order is placed in period t; and It = max( 1; I^t).
Because the supplier does not incur backorder cost, for any negative net inventory in a period
the supplier has the same immediate cost (zero inventory holding cost) and performance
outcome (stockout) in that period. Since the dynamic program is to calculate the suppliers
cost, in the state space, we can use a single state  1 to represent all the states of negative
inventory.
The state space is f(t 1; It) : 0  t 1  t  1,  1  It  Sg, where 1  t  R + 1 and
S is a large number such that F2( S)  1.
The suppliers action (inventory order-up-to level) in a period is S 2 f0; 1; ::; Sg.
The state transition is as follows:
It+1 = max( 1; St   dt), t =
(
t 1 + 1, if It  dt,
t 1, if It < dt.
Let t 1 = i for 1  t  R + 1. Note that 0 = 0. All the expectation calculations E
below are on dt.
Because there is no decision on the inventory order-up-to level made in decision epoch
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R + 1, the suppliers cost in period t is dened di¤erently for 1  t  R and t = R + 1,
rt((i; It); St) = hE[It   dt]+, if 1  t  R;
rR+1(i; IR+1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(
K if i  R,
0 if i > R,
lump-sum penalty;(
K(R + 1  i) if i  R,
0 if i > R,
linear penalty.
(13)
Furthermore, the transition probabilities of the states are
pt((j; I) j (i; u); S) =
8>>>><>>>>:
PrfD(1) = S   Ig, if j = i+ 1, S  u, 0  S   I  u, I  0,
PrfD(1) = S   Ig, if j = i, S  u, S   I > u, I  0,
PrfD(1) > Sg, if j = i, S  u, I =  1,
0, otherwise.
.
Let 1t (St j i; It) denote the suppliers cost to go from period t in a single review phase
given performance history i, It, and St. Dene 1t (i; It) = minStIt 
1
t (St j i; It), where 1t (i; It)
denotes the suppliers optimal cost to go from period t given i and It.
The dynamic program is
1t (i; It) =
8><>:
hE[It   dt]+ + minStItf
PIt
d=0E[
1
t+1(i+ 1; St   d)] Pr[D(1) = d]
+
P
d>It
E[1t+1(i;max( 1; St   d))] Pr[D(1) = d]g, if 1  t  R,
rR+1(i; IR+1), if t = R + 1.
The suppliers inventory decision made in period R of a review phase cannot a¤ect her
performance in that review phase, but it determines the inventory holding cost and perfor-
mance outcome in period 1 of the next review phase. So the optimal order-up-to level SR in
period R is SR = arg minSIR E[1(0;max( 1; S  dR))], where E[1(0;max( 1; S  dR))] =PS
d=0 1(0; S   d) PrfD(1) = dg+ 1(0; 1) F1(S) is the suppliers expected cost to go from
period 1 of the next review phase. We conjecture that if possible, the supplier will choose
the rst-best base-stock level S in period R. So in the single-review-phase problem, let
SR = maxfIR; Sg.
From the dynamic program, we can obtain 11(0; I1) for various opening inventory levels I1.
The optimal inventory policy obtained for this single review phase is not optimal in general
for the innite horizon problem because the terminal cost rR+1 ignores the inventory holding
cost in the early periods of the next review phase resulting from the suppliers inventory
choice in period R of the current review phase.
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D.1.2 The case of L = 0
Compared to the case of L = 1, the denition of It is modied as
It = the suppliers inventory on hand at the beginning of period t, before an order is
placed in period t.
Because the supplier does not incur the backorder cost, for any nonpositive net inventory
in a period, the supplier has the same immediate cost (zero inventory holding cost). Due
to a zero lead time, the inventory performance in any period is determined by the order-
up-to level rather than the net inventory in that period. Note that a zero order-up-to level
dominates any negative ones because the inventory costs in both cases are zero and the
suppliers performance under the former choice may be better than that under the latter
when the demand in a period is zero. Thus in the state space, we can use 0 to represent all
the states of nonpositive inventory.
The state space is f(t 1; It) : 0  t 1  t  1, 0  It  Sg where 1  t  R + 1 and S
is a large number such that F1( S)  1.
The suppliers action in each period is the inventory order-up-to level in that period,
S 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; Sg.
The state transition is as follows:
It+1 = [St   dt]+, t =
(
t 1 + 1, if St  dt;
t 1, if St < dt.
The suppliers cost in period t is given by
rt((i; It); St) = hE[St   dt]+ if 1  t  R,
and the denition of rR+1(i; IR+1) is the same as that in (13). Notice that in this single-
review-phase model there is no consequence of having closing inventory IR+1.
The transition probabilities are dened as
pt((j; I) j (i; u); S) =
8><>:
PrfD(1) = S   Ig, if j = i+ 1, S  u, I  0;
PrfD(1) > Sg, if j = i, S  u, I = 0;
0, otherwise.
In period t, for the order-up-to level St  It,
1t (St j i; It) = hE[St   dt]+ +
XSt
d=0
E[1t+1(i+ 1; St   d)] Pr[D(1) = d] + F1(St)1t+1(i; 0);
the optimal cost to go from period t is
1t (i; It) = minStIt 
1
t (St j i; It).
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Thus the dynamic program is
1R+1(i; IR+1) = rR+1(i; IR+1);
1t (i; It) = minStIt 
1
t (St j i; It) if 1  t  R.
D.2 Innite-horizon problem
Instead of treating the innite horizon as consisting of many time periods, we can think of
each review phase as one time period in the innite horizon, i.e., the innite horizon consists
of many review phases. So all of the suppliers inventory policies in the n-th nite review
phase can be denoted by a vector n = (
n
1 ; 
n
2 ; : : : ; 
n
R) 2  , where nt is the suppliers
inventory policy in period t of the n-th review phase, and   is the set of possible inventory
policies in a review phase. Although the suppliers inventory policy within a review phase
depends on her performance history in that review phase and so is history dependent, n and
11(0; I1) are only dependent on I1, the opening inventory of a review phase. Let the opening
inventory of a review phase be the system states. The system states and   do not vary with
time, and the state transitions (from the opening inventory of a review phase to that of the
subsequent phase) as well as the suppliers costs (expected total cost in a review phase) are
Markovian. Thus the suppliers problem in an innite horizon consisting of review phases is
a Markov decision process. We assume that the supplier only uses deterministic inventory
policies. Due to demand uncertainty, this MDP is unichain.
To calculate the suppliers optimal average cost in an innite horizon, we use value iter-
ation. Let 1(I) denote the suppliers minimum expected total cost in a single review phase
with an opening inventory I as derived above. Let n(I) denote the suppliers minimum
expected total cost in n review phases with an opening inventory I in the rst review phase.
With n review phases, the review phases are indexed reversely from 1 to n, i.e., the last
review phase is indexed by 1 and the rst by n.
The algorithm is described as follows.
1. Let 1(I) = 11(0; I), " = 0:001, and set n = 1.
2. For each I 2 f 1; 0; : : : ; Sg, compute n+1(I) by applying the dynamic program as
dened above for a single-review-phase problem but with the terminal cost rR+1(i; IR+1)
added by n(IR+1).
3. If maxI [n+1(I)   n(I)]   minI [n+1(I)   n(I)] < ", then go to step 4. Otherwise,
increment n by 1 and return to step 2.
4. Let V = maxI [n+1(I)   n(I)]=R. Then V is an approximation to the suppliers
optimal long-run average cost.
Note that n+1(I)   n(I) is the suppliers total cost in the rst review phase (because
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of reverse index) given an opening inventory I. When the inequality in step 3 holds, the
di¤erence between its maximum and minimum values is su¢ ciently small, then the maximum
value divided by R provides an approximation (in fact an upper bound) to the suppliers
optimal long-run average cost.
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